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SM-004 Mountaineering · Nanga Parbat, Himalaya 1937

The 1937 Nanga Parbat Disaster — Sixteen men buried alive in their sleep

Lost
16 men (7 Germans, 9 Sherpas)
Peak
Nanga Parbat, 8,126 m
Ended
Night of 14–15 June 1937, Camp IV
Status
All died

Summary

On the night of 14–15 June 1937, an avalanche of ice swept down onto Camp IV of a German expedition on Nanga Parbat, in the western Himalaya, and buried sixteen men as they slept. All of them died — seven German climbers and nine Sherpa porters, almost the entire climbing party — without warning and, by every later account, without waking. It was the deadliest single event in the history of mountaineering to that time, and it remains one of the worst. The mountain stands at 8,126 metres in what is now the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan; Camp IV lay at roughly 6,180 metres on a snow terrace above the Rakhiot Glacier, beneath the ice cliffs of Rakhiot Peak.

The expedition was led by Karl Wien and was the latest German attempt on a mountain that had become a national obsession after the disaster of 1934, when Willy Merkl's expedition lost climbers and porters in a storm high on the same Rakhiot face. The 1937 party was working its way up that face, establishing camps in heavy snow, when the entire camp was overrun. The dead Germans were Karl Wien, Hans Hartmann, Adolf Göttner, Günther Hepp, Martin Pfeffer, Pert Müllritter and Otto Fankhauser. The nine Sherpas killed alongside them — men whose labour carried every load up that mountain and whose deaths were long recorded more faintly than the climbers' — were Pasang, Nim Tsering, Mambahadur, Kami, Gyaljen Monjo, Jigmay, Chong Karma, Ang Tsering II and Da Thondup. This record names them in full.

The disaster left no survivors at the high camp to describe it, so its sequence was reconstructed only weeks later, when a relief expedition under Paul Bauer dug down through the avalanche debris to the buried tents. What they found — men still in their sleeping bags, faces calm, killed in an instant — established what had happened: a mass of ice had broken from the cliffs hundreds of metres above and crossed the supposedly safe terrace in seconds, entombing the camp under metres of snow and ice before anyone could stir.

Timeline

1934
The first disaster
Willy Merkl's German expedition is caught by a storm high on Nanga Parbat's Rakhiot face; climbers and porters die, fixing the mountain's deadly reputation.
Spring 1937
The next attempt
A German expedition led by Karl Wien sets out for Nanga Parbat, following the established Rakhiot-face route up the northern side.
May–June 1937
Slow progress in deep snow
Heavy, persistent snowfall slows the building of the chain of camps up the face toward the Silver Saddle and the summit.
7 June 1937
Camp IV established
The expedition sets Camp IV at about 6,180 m on a snow terrace above the Rakhiot Glacier, below the ice cliffs of Rakhiot Peak.
~11–14 June 1937
The party concentrates high
Seven German climbers and nine Sherpas gather at Camp IV, almost the entire team, waiting out the weather for a push higher.
Night, 14–15 June 1937
The avalanche
Shortly after midnight a mass of ice breaks from cliffs 300–400 m above and sweeps across the terrace, burying the camp under metres of ice and snow.
Mid-June 1937
Silence from above
Lower camps and base receive no word; the scale of the loss is not yet understood as bad weather blocks any approach.
Late June 1937
The mountain confirms the worst
It becomes clear that the entire Camp IV party is gone — sixteen men, the deadliest single mountaineering event then recorded.
15 July 1937 onward
Bauer's relief expedition digs in
A search party led by Paul Bauer reaches Camp IV and excavates the debris, locating the buried tents.
Summer 1937
The dead recovered
Several bodies are found in their sleeping bags, faces calm; a diary records that the camp's position had been judged unsafe from avalanches.

The Killer Mountain

By 1937 Nanga Parbat had earned its German name, the Schicksalsberg — the "mountain of destiny" — and its grimmer reputation as a killer. It is the ninth-highest mountain on Earth, a vast, isolated massif at the western end of the Himalaya whose Rakhiot face, on the northern side, was the line the German expeditions of the 1930s chose to climb. That face rises in a series of glacier terraces and ice slopes toward the Silver Saddle and the long summit ridge, and it is raked by avalanches from the hanging glaciers and ice cliffs that overhang it. The 1934 expedition under Willy Merkl had already died there, caught by a storm during a desperate retreat from high on the mountain, and the 1937 party climbed in the shadow of that loss.

The German attempts of this era were heavily nationalistic undertakings, pursued with state interest and triumphalist press, and they depended absolutely on Sherpa porters recruited from Darjeeling and Sikkim — experienced high-altitude men, several of whom had served on earlier Himalayan and Everest expeditions. These were not anonymous bearers but skilled mountaineers in their own right: Da Thondup had reached the high camps on Nanga Parbat in 1934, Kami had carried to Camp IV on Everest in 1936, and Nim Tsering had worked with a French expedition in the Karakoram. The route up the Rakhiot face placed camps beneath ice that could release without warning, and the calculus of the climb — accepting that exposure in order to stock the high camps — fell, as ever, most heavily on the men who did the carrying.

A camp in the wrong place

Through May and into June 1937 the expedition pushed its chain of camps up the face against persistent heavy snowfall that slowed every move. Camp IV was placed on 7 June on a broad snow terrace above the Rakhiot Glacier at roughly 6,180 metres, a flat, sheltered-seeming spot that served as the staging point for the climb to the Silver Saddle. The terrace lay below the ice cliffs of Rakhiot Peak, and the danger of that position was not entirely unrecognized: a diary later recovered from the site recorded that the camp was judged not wholly safe from avalanches. But the terrace was the natural place to gather, and gather the party did. By mid-June seven German climbers and nine Sherpas — almost the whole expedition — were concentrated at Camp IV, waiting out the weather before pressing higher.

That concentration of the entire team in one exposed place was the fatal condition. On a mountain, a camp beneath ice cliffs trades the certainty of a hard climbing position for the gamble that the ice above will hold. For days it did. The men slept in their tents on the terrace, the loads stacked around them, the route to the saddle waiting above. There was no storm at the moment of the disaster, no struggle, no warning climb gone wrong — only sixteen men asleep in a place where, sooner or later, the ice was always going to come down.

What the diggers found

Shortly after midnight on the night of 14–15 June, a mass of ice broke away from cliffs 300 to 400 metres above the camp and avalanched down onto the terrace, crossing it in seconds and burying the tents under metres of ice and packed snow. The sixteen men were killed where they lay. No one at Camp IV survived to send word, and for weeks the lower camps and base could only register an ominous silence from above while bad weather blocked any approach. As the scale of the loss became undeniable, it was understood as the worst single disaster mountaineering had known: an entire high party, sixteen lives, erased in an instant.

A relief expedition under Paul Bauer, a veteran of German Himalayan climbing, reached the site and from about 15 July began the grim work of excavating the debris. Digging down through the avalanche, the searchers located the buried tents and recovered several of the dead, found still in their sleeping bags. The detail that fixed the manner of their deaths was recorded plainly: the men lay without any sign of alarm in their faces or their hands. They had been killed in their sleep, faster than fear. Not all the bodies could be recovered from the mass of ice, and the mountain kept most of them. The seven Germans and nine Sherpas of Camp IV — Wien, Hartmann, Göttner, Hepp, Pfeffer, Müllritter and Fankhauser, and Pasang, Nim Tsering, Mambahadur, Kami, Gyaljen Monjo, Jigmay, Chong Karma, Ang Tsering II and Da Thondup — were gone together.

The Five Factors

01
A camp beneath hanging ice
Camp IV stood on a terrace directly below the ice cliffs of Rakhiot Peak, and a diary recovered from the site shows the danger had been noted. Siting a camp in the runout of an objective hazard that can release without warning is the single decision that made the disaster possible; everything else followed from where the tents were pitched.
02
Objective hazard, not human error in the moment
The avalanche was a release of ice from cliffs hundreds of metres above, beyond any climber's control once the camp was placed. This was not a fall, a storm caught in the open, or a navigational mistake but a hazard inherent to the terrain — the kind of risk that can only be avoided by not being there, never by climbing well.
03
Concentration of the whole party in one place
Almost the entire expedition — sixteen of its members — was gathered at the single exposed camp at the moment of the avalanche, so a single event could kill everyone at once. Massing a team in one hazardous spot converts a local accident into a total loss; dispersion would have left survivors and witnesses.
04
No warning and no escape
The avalanche struck near midnight, crossed the terrace in seconds, and buried the camp before anyone could wake or move. Against an ice release of that speed and mass there is no reaction time and no shelter; the men were entombed in their sleeping bags. Hazards that allow no warning leave preparation and skill irrelevant.
05
Escalation of national commitment
Nanga Parbat had become a German obsession after 1934, pursued under heavy state and press pressure to succeed where the previous expedition had died. That investment kept teams returning to the same lethal face and pressing camps up it, a momentum of commitment that normalized exposure to a mountain that had already shown what it would do.

Aftermath

Sixteen men died in an instant, the deadliest single event mountaineering had then recorded, and the loss fell on Germany as a national tragedy in an era when the Nanga Parbat campaign carried political weight. Paul Bauer's relief expedition recovered what bodies it could and brought home the diaries that allowed the disaster to be reconstructed; the following year a further German expedition on the same face encountered and buried more of the dead from the 1934 and 1937 catastrophes, a measure of how thoroughly the mountain had become a graveyard. Germany returned again, and Nanga Parbat was not climbed until 1953, when Hermann Buhl reached the summit alone — by which time the mountain had killed dozens in pursuit of it and carried the name Killer Mountain.

What the 1937 disaster taught, and what mountaineering slowly absorbed, was the lethal logic of the avalanche-exposed camp: that a tent pitched beneath hanging ice is gambling against an event no skill can survive, and that the gamble eventually loses. The nine Sherpas who died at Camp IV deserve to be remembered by name and not as a number appended to the climbers' loss — Pasang, Nim Tsering, Mambahadur, Kami, Gyaljen Monjo, Jigmay, Chong Karma, Ang Tsering II and Da Thondup — experienced high-altitude men who carried the expedition up the mountain and died with it. They are buried where they slept, on the Rakhiot face of Nanga Parbat.

Lessons

  1. Never site a camp in the runout of hanging ice or an avalanche path; against an objective release, position is the only defence.
  2. Treat objective hazards as risks to be avoided by absence, not managed by skill — you cannot climb well enough to survive a serac.
  3. Do not concentrate an entire party in one exposed place, where a single event can kill everyone at once.
  4. Resist the momentum of national or institutional commitment that keeps returning a team to a face that has already proven lethal.
  5. Name and credit the Sherpa porters who share the expedition's risk and its dead, rather than recording them as an anonymous toll.

References